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ABSTRACT 
 Presented herein are techniques for correlating the output of a crowd counting 
machine learning (ML) algorithm, which operates on surveillance video, with observed 
network load to determine if a load spike is due to a valid network usage or an attacker 
trying to sabotage the network.  The techniques presented herein include vision field 
classification based on access point (AP) coverage, linking of vision fields to AP coverage 
in DNAC UI, and consensus-based threat assessment and alerts. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Wireless networks deployed in public venues (e.g., airports, stadiums, etc.) exhibit 
large variance in traffic volume characteristics, depending on the number of occupants and 
their mobility patterns. For instance, in an airport, it is expected to see network capacity 
usage spiking at the access points near the gate/terminal at which an aircraft arrives.  A 
problem with conventional techniques is that there is no way to determine whether the 
capacity increase is due to real users or a fake capacity load created by an attacker/jammer. 
 
 
Section 1: Solution Summary 
The techniques presented herein propose correlating the output of a crowd counting 
machine learning (ML) algorithm, which operates on surveillance video, with observed 
network load to determine if the load spike is due to a valid network usage or an attacker 
trying to sabotage the network.  In general, the crowd counting algorithm will leverage out 
of band information from co-located camera systems or other third party security systems 
that provide a programmable application program interfaces (APIs), such as programmable 
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closed-circuit television (CCTV) control APIs, programmable camera APIs, 
programmable security system APIs.  The techniques presented herein include vision field 
classification based on access point (AP) coverage, linking of vision fields to AP coverage 
in DNAC UI, and consensus-based threat assessment and alerts. 
Wireless attackers are difficult to classify since there is no physical connection 
which identifies devices in the wired world.  This makes the detection of such attackers all 
the more difficult.  Moreover, unlike wired networks where attacks can be launched from 
a different continent, by the nature of wireless channels themselves, a wireless attacker 
needs to be in proximity to the access point to launch an attack.  As such, the techniques 
presented herein address an important problem where, by correlating a wireless user 
location with certain vision fields, the chances of catching an attacker (if any) on camera 
are significantly increased.  Additionally, if the attack is conducted using an RF-jammer, 
in a regular case there are no simple solutions except just changing wireless channels. 
However, using the techniques presented herein, a deterrent is created by capturing the 
attacker on video or pictures. This also helps to confirm the identity and location of the 
jammer (if any). 
 
Section 2: Design Overview – Camera-Augmented Security System 
An example deployment for a Camera-Augment Security System, as proposed 
herein, is shown below in FIG. 1. 
 
 
FIG. 1 
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As shown, the deployment includes cameras that are co-located with access points. 
In certain deployments, the cameras have video coverage over the typical service area of 
access points.  The inputs from the cameras are fed into a camera-augmented threat 
classification engine. This ML classification engine takes into account both the images 
from the cameras as well as network statistics provided from the access points (e.g., via the 
controller).  The output from the ML classification engine is fed to a controller for alerts 
and display.  Each of the components within the deployment are explained in further detail 
below. 
 
Section 3: Vision Field Correlation with AP coverage 
A vision field is defined as the area on a floor which is visually seen by a camera. 
The first design challenge for the proposed approach is the matching of the images from 
the cameras (vision fields) with the coverage area of the access point.  In one embodiment, 
the programmable cameras are coupled with access points at the time of deployment 
through a provisioning step.  In another embodiment, an automatic discovery mechanism 
may be employed. 
Section 4: Consensus Based Threat Assessment and Alerts  
For the purpose of threat classification, the techniques presented herein use an ML 
approach that jointly looks at the network statistics from the access point and the image 
output from the corresponding vision fields of the cameras.  In one example, a smart threat 
detection and classification architecture is designed as shown below in FIG. 2. 
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FIG. 2 
 
In this embodiment, two (2) ML components, one for image classification and one 
for threat classification, are employed and run based on network statistics. The output of 
both of these components are probabilities of certain events which are fed into the threat 
analytics decision box.  A description of how each of these components are setup and 
used is provided below. 
 
Image Classified Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
There are a number of third party and open source neural network engines which 
can do image classification. In accordance with the techniques presented herein, the 
classifier is trained to flag images from the cameras that correlate with high usage vs those 
that do not.  It is important to note that such an approach will also take into account usage 
patterns, such as differentiating a couple of users generating a huge load, a lot of users, or 
a jammer. 
The output of this classifier is the probability outcome: Num users > Thresh prob 
(PGT[i]) 
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Network Statistics Analytics ANN 
Proposed herein is the use of another ANN that independently looks at network 
statistics, such as the number of unique MAC addresses seen in a time window, the amount 
of traffic passed through the access point, the ratio of uplink traffic to downlink traffic, 
data rates used by the traffic, etc.  This ANN is a ML engine, which looks at these statistics 
and predicts if these are potentially from an attacker or not.  
The neural network will use sigmoid activation functions with back propagation. 
These will be trained on well-known attack and benign traffic patterns seen in the field for 
classification.   
The output of this ML engine is a probability TP[i], which indicates if the current 
instance of network statistics for AP[i] indicates an attack. 
 
Threat Analytics Decision Box 
The threat analytics decision module accepts the following inputs from the two 
previous modules for every instance of images relevant to AP[i] and corresponding AP[i] 
statistics: 
(1) Probability outcome: Num users > Thresh prob = PGT[i]; 
(2) Threat probability seen at AP[i] which is denoted as TP[i]; and 
(3) Traffic load at AP[i] denoted as L[i]. 
 
Outcomes (classifications and corrective actions) 
 Action 1-- If it is a legitimate group of users, then no actions are taken. 
 Action 2-- If it is disproportionate usage by a few users, the information 
could be used to throttle user limits. 
 Action 3-- If an attacker is observed, this can be flagged to a system 
administrator and he/she may use the camera feeds to flag that as actual 
events or false detects. 
 
In one embodiment, the module performs the following: 
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In this case, the classifier's output can be used to compare what is observed through 
network statistics (e.g., approximate clients or traffic generating unique mac addresses). In 
this case, three simple classification buckets, such as (1) <10 users, (2) 10 to 20 users, and 
(3) >20 users could be generated.  This output of the classifier could be used to match with 
what is observed in the network monitoring. 
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Section 5: Linking of Vision Fields to AP Coverage in DNAC UI 
Once the images are matched (cameras and their outputs) with the coverage area of 
wireless access points, the techniques presented may employ section in the UI where a user 
can click an access point on the topology and see the images of the coverage area.  Such 
an approach in the UI uniquely ties the network maintenance with smart camera outputs. 
Section 6: Discussions 
In general, the techniques presented herein are ML independent and are not tied to 
one type of ML for crowd counting and classification. In fact, in another embodiment, the 
techniques presented herein can separately leverage more than one third party or open 
source applications for this process. 
Additionally, the techniques presented herein are camera hardware independent 
and can leverage any programmable hardware for the deployment. 
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